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Abstract: Past decades have witnessed a shift in international cooperation toward growing 
involvement of transnational actors (TNAs), such as non-governmental organizations, 
multinational corporations, and philanthropic foundations. This article offers a comprehensive 
theoretical and empirical account of TNA access to IOs. The analysis builds on a novel 
dataset, covering formal TNA access to 298 organizational bodies from 50 IOs over the time 
period 1950 to 2010. We identify the most profound patterns in TNA access across time, issue 
areas, policy functions, and world regions, and statistically test competing explanations of the 
variation in TNA access. The central results are three-fold. First, the empirical data confirm 
the existence of a far-reaching institutional transformation of IOs over the past sixty years, 
pervading all issue areas, policy functions, and world regions. Second, variation in TNA 
access within and across IOs is mainly explained by a combination of three factors: functional 
demand for the resources of TNAs, domestic democratic standards in the membership of IOs, 
and state concerns with national sovereignty. Third, existing research suffers from a selection 
bias that has led it to overestimate the general importance of a new participatory norm in 
global governance for the openness of IOs. 
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Introduction 
 
While international organizations (IOs) were long the exclusive preserve of member 
governments, the past decades have witnessed a shift toward forms of governance that involve 
transnational actors (TNAs), such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), philanthropic 
foundations, scientific communities, and multinational corporations. Increasingly, IOs are 
engaging transnational actors as policy experts, service providers, compliance watchdogs and 
stakeholder representatives.1 International organizations with an historical record of no or 
limited access, such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), have 
gradually opened up to TNAs, while IOs that already had a tradition of interaction, such as the 
United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe, have become even more open. At the same 
time, fundamental differences in TNA access remain, both across and within international 
organizations. 
 These developments present us with a set of puzzles. First, why would states, typically 
protective of national sovereignty and political influence, compromise their traditional 
monopoly of power in IOs? Second, what explains the dramatic growth in TNA access to IOs 
over recent decades, which contradicts common assumptions of stability in the design of IOs? 
Third, what accounts for remaining differences in openness across and within IOs? Common 
to all of these puzzles is the question of what has driven and constrained TNA access to 
produce the patterns we observe.  
 This article offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical account of TNA access to 
IOs. Understanding TNA access is central to the theory and practice of global governance. 
Once we know where, how, and why IOs open up, we can get traction on some of the critical 
questions in world politics. When do states share authority with private actors? What drives 
the design of international organizations? How does TNA involvement affect political 
                                                 
1
 Raustiala 1997; O’Brien at al. 2000; Steffek et al. 2008; Jönsson and Tallberg 2010; Scholte 2011; Risse 2012. 
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outcomes in IOs? Can openness toward civil-society actors help ameliorate democratic 
deficits in global governance? 
 We conceive of TNA access as a dimension of the institutional design of IOs, similar to 
dimensions such as policy remit, geographical scope, and the autonomy of IO bodies.2 Access 
is distinct from participation, even if the two often go together. While access consists of the 
institutional mechanisms whereby TNAs may take part in the policy process of an IO, and 
may be granted either by the member states of an IO or by international bureaucracies 
servicing the IO, participation denotes TNAs’ presence in these institutional venues. In this 
article, we focus exclusively on institutional access.3 We define TNAs as private non-profit or 
for-profit actors that operate in relation to IOs.4 We treat them as one category because we 
have no strong theoretical reason to restrict the empirical scope to only a sub-set of private 
actors. Moreover, while IOs typically emphasize criteria such as competence and activities in 
multiple countries, they seldom discriminate between non-profit and for-profit actors when 
granting access. 
 Our analysis builds on a novel dataset, covering formal TNA access to 298 
organizational bodies from 50 IOs over the time period 1950 to 2010. On the basis of this 
dataset, we identify the most profound patterns in TNA access across time, issue areas, policy 
functions, and world regions, and statistically test competing explanations of the variation in 
TNA access. This research design breaks with previous scholarship on TNA involvement in 
IOs, which is dominated by accounts of single IOs or issue areas. Existing research boasts a 
rich set of in-depth studies of individual IOs, such as the UN, the WTO, and the European 
Union (EU).5 Some studies expand beyond individual IOs, addressing TNA involvement 
within a particular issue area, such as economic governance, environmental politics, human 
                                                 
2
 Koremenos et al. 2001; Koremenos 2012. 
3
 On participation, see Hanegraaff et al. 2011. 
4
 Cf. Tallberg and Jönsson 2010; Risse 2012. 
5
 See, e.g., Weiss and Gordenker 1996; Charnovitz 2000; Willetts 2000; Steffek and Ehling 2008; Saurugger 
2010; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011. 
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rights, and development.6 So far, however, there are very few studies with a comparative 
scope and no comprehensive large-N studies.7 
 We argue that variation in TNA access within and across IOs is explained mainly by a 
combination of three causal factors: demand for the resources and services of TNAs, domestic 
democratic standards in the membership of IOs, and state concerns with national sovereignty. 
The principal drivers of openness in global governance have been functional demands for 
TNA resources that enable IOs to address governance problems more efficiently and 
effectively, and domestic democracy among the member states of IOs. Sovereignty costs 
associated with reductions in state control have been the principal constraint on TNA access, 
also contributing to distinct patterns of variation across policy functions and issue areas. The 
central transformative event in the historical development of TNA access was the end of the 
Cold War, which led to growing functional demands for TNA involvement in international 
cooperation, strengthened the voice of democratic states within IOs, and loosened the 
constraint of national sovereignty. 
 By contrast, we find only limited support for the conventional wisdom in existing 
research, which suggests that patterns of TNA access reflect the spread of a participatory 
norm in global governance. According to this argument, IOs have expanded TNA access, 
either because policy-makers have been socialized into believing in the appropriateness of 
participatory governance, or because they have adapted strategically to this norm for purposes 
of organizational legitimation. We conclude that a selection bias in existing research has led it 
to overestimate the general importance of norm change as a source of growing openness in 
global governance. Contributions that privilege norm adaptation tend to focus on the UN, the 
EU, and the large economic multilaterals, which probably offer the best examples of this logic 
at work, but are unrepresentative of the general population of IOs in this regard. 
                                                 
6
 Raustiala 1997; O’Brien et al. 2000; Reimann 2006; Hawkins 2008; Green 2010. 
7
 For studies with a comparative scope, see Steffek et al. 2008; Scholte 2011; Alter 2012. 
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 The article proceeds in four steps. First, we introduce the dataset and map the 
transnational turn in global governance, presenting descriptive data on patterns in TNA 
access. Second, we outline the two theoretical accounts of TNA access, and derive testable 
hypotheses. Third, we assess these alternative arguments on the basis of a statistical analysis. 
Finally, we summarize our findings and outline the implications of our analysis for research 
on international institutional design, transnational influence, and democracy in global 
governance. 
 
 
TNA Access in Global Governance, 1950-2010 
 
IOs display extensive variation in the organization of TNA involvement. We describe the 
principal patterns of variation on the basis of a new dataset on formal TNA access to 298 
bodies of 50 IOs over the sixty-year period 1950-2010. The selected IOs comprise a stratified 
random sample. This sample was drawn from a list of 182 IOs that were identified by 
applying a set of five criteria to the Correlates of War IGO Dataset.8 To be included an 
organization must: (1) be intergovernmental; (2) be independent from other IOs as regards 
budget, decision-making, and reporting requirements; (3) have at least three members; (4) 
have at least one organizational body that operates on a permanent basis; and (5) be active in 
2010.  
 To ensure that the sample represents the breadth of the IGO population, we applied 
stratified random sampling. The 182 IOs were categorized into ten issue areas and five world 
regions. Then, a random sample was drawn from each category, leading to a final set of 50 
                                                 
8
 Pevehouse et al. 2004. We cross-checked our list against the CIA World Factbook. 
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IOs.9 As a result, our sample includes both major, well-known IOs, such as the UN and the 
WTO, and lesser known regional or specialized organizations, such as the Wassenaar 
Arrangement and the International Coffee Organization. 
 We operate with IO bodies, such as ministerial councils, committees, and secretariats, as 
the unit of analysis. IOs are not monolithic entities and, as we shall see, TNA access varies 
within as well as across IOs. A focus on IO bodies thus permits a more fine-grained and 
comprehensive analysis of variation in TNA access in global governance. The dataset 
exclusively captures formal access to IO bodies, as laid down in treaty provisions, rules of 
procedure, ministerial decisions, policy guidelines, or equivalent.10 The data have been 
collected on the basis of documents from archives, databases, and direct data requests to the 
relevant IOs. The dataset does not capture informal access to IO bodies, developed through 
customs and practices.11 
 We measure TNA access with a composite index that contains four dimensions of 
access. First, the depth of access captures the level of involvement offered to TNAs through 
institutional rules, and covers a continuum from active and direct involvement, sometimes 
mirroring that of member states, to passive and indirect involvement, such as observing 
negotiations. Second, the range of access captures the breadth of TNAs entitled to participate, 
and includes a spectrum from all interested TNAs to only those that fulfill a very restrictive  
  
                                                 
9
 For a similar strategy, see Hawdon 1997. For some categories there was no corresponding IO. In these cases, 
the subsample was supplemented with multi-issue organizations from the same region, global organizations from 
the same issue area, or global multi-issue IOs. 
10
 An alternative measure of TNA involvement in global governance is delegation to TNAs through international 
treaties (see Koremenos 2008; Green 2010). However, given our primary interest in the institutional design of 
IOs, TNA access to IO bodies was the more natural choice. As opposed to delegation, this measure also allows 
us to capture access granted by both member states and supranational bureaucracies of IOs. 
11
 While informal access is beyond the scope of the analysis here, we view it as an important component of 
access. See Tallberg et al. forthcoming. 
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Table 1. Measuring TNA Access: Indicators for Depth and Range 
Depth of Access  
Score Level 
 
Generic Examples Illustrations 
4 Full and 
autonomous 
Right to vote; right to lodge 
legal complaint 
Full membership of the General Assembly of 
the Fund for the Development of the 
Indigenous Peoples of Latin America; right 
for any person, NGO or group of individuals 
to submit complaints to the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
 
3 Active and direct Present statement at meeting; 
collaborate on projects 
Right to make written statements and oral 
presentations at UN ECOSOC; cooperation in 
the development and implementation of 
programs of the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE. 
 
2 Active and indirect Special meetings with TNAs; 
consult on projects 
NGO program parallel to annual meetings of 
the Board of Governors of the Asian 
Development Bank; NGO liaison officer at 
the Secretariat of the Pacific Island 
Foundation.   
 
1 Passive Observe meeting; TNA briefing Gallery open to experts and special guests for 
meetings of the Pan-African Parliament of the 
African Union; NGO briefings at WTO 
Ministerial Meetings. 
 
0 None -  
Range of Access  
Score Selection 
 
Generic examples Illustrations 
4 None All interested TNAs; general 
public 
Hearings of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights of the Organization of 
American States are open to the public; 
any individual or entity can contribute 
statements during the preliminary review of 
the World Bank Inspection Panel. 
 
3 Formal TNAs from member states or a 
specific sector; international 
TNAs 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe can consider communications from 
NGOs concerned with the protection of 
human rights; private sector organizations can 
become observers at the Private Sector 
Consultative Board of the ICO. 
 
2 Comprehensive Conform to IO goals, 
transparent financing, 
democratic structure 
NGOs that can make substantive and 
sustained contributions to UN objectives can 
get general consultative status with ECOSOC; 
international NGOs with wide economic 
responsibilities, broad representation of a 
sector, and bodies in most member states can 
consult with the OECD Ministerial Council.  
 
8 
 
1 Demanding Identified TNAs; very select 
TNA categories 
Guest experts can be invited to the Scientific 
Council of the Northwest Atlantic Fishery 
Organization; International Federation of Red 
Cross has exclusive observer status at the UN 
General Assembly. 
 
0 - 
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set of selection criteria. Table 1 summarizes the coding along these two primary dimensions 
of access, which are each measured on a five-point scale.  In addition, the index contains two 
secondary dimensions. The permanence of access captures the extent to which institutional 
rules grant a permanent right for TNAs to be involved, or whether such privileges are ad hoc 
or by invitation.12 The codification of access captures how access is legally regulated, and 
thus its revocability, by distinguishing between regulation through treaties, secondary 
legislation, or bureaucratic decisions.13 The scores on each of these four dimensions are 
aggregated into a composite index. Depth and range form the additive component of the 
index, since they are constitutive of access, defining what rights are granted to whom, while 
permanence and codification function as weighting factors, because they shape the regularity 
and revocability of the depth and range of access. Since many IO bodies offer more than one 
type of access, the composite index is defined by the sum of all arrangements for each body, 
divided by the number of arrangements per body: 
 
Accessave ൌ ଵ௡  ෌ ሺRange ൅  Depthሻ  כ  Permanence כ  Codificationሻ௡ଵ  
 
 The data corroborate the existence of a profound shift in the design of IOs over time. 
Figure 1 displays the openness of IO bodies from 1950 to 2010, using the composite index. 
The figure reveals an increase in the formal openness of IOs over these sixty years, especially 
since 1990. From 1950 until 1990, TNA access was relatively low. In the period since 1990, 
there has been strong and continuous growth in TNA access.  In 2010, 71 of 208 open IO 
bodies offered the maximum range of access, among them the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in  
                                                 
12
 Permanence of access is measured on a two-point scale: permanent (score = 1) and ad hoc (score = 0.5). 
13
 Codification is measured on a three-point scale: regulation through treaty provisions (score = 1.5), secondary 
legislation (score = 1), and bureaucratic decisions (score = 0.5). 
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Figure 1. TNA Access over Time, 1950-2010 (Index) 
Note: The figure excludes IO bodies below the 10th percentile and above the 90th percentile to minimize the 
influence of outliers on the presentation of the time trend.  
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Europe (OSCE), and 32 bodies provided the maximum depth of access, such as the Business 
Advisory Council of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.14 At the same time, 86 bodies in 
the sample remained entirely closed, including the IMF Executive Board. 
 The frequency weights in Figure 1 show that the increase in the average level of TNA 
access is paralleled by a growing number of open IO bodies. About one quarter (26.5 percent) 
of the overtime trend stems from the creation of new IO bodies with access, while nearly three 
quarters (73.5 percent) is the product of institutional changes to existing IO bodies. Figure 1 
also points to growing variation in the arrangements of TNA access, as illustrated by the 
dispersion of the frequency weights. In other words, there has not been a convergence toward 
a single standard of openness. 
The arrangements for TNA access typically vary within IOs, confirming the 
appropriateness of IO bodies as the unit of analysis.15 Figure 2 illustrates such internal 
variation within the UN, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the OSCE, contrasting 
examples of highly open IO bodies with less accessible bodies of the same IOs. In the UN, the 
General Assembly has been consistently less open than ECOSOC, which offered access from 
its founding. However, both bodies moved to more generous access in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The ADB did not offer access to the Management and the Board of Governors at its founding. 
In the mid-1980s, however, the Management began to provide TNAs access and has become 
more open since, while the Board of Governors opened later and to a lesser extent. The 
OSCE’s ODIHR and Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) were both created in the early 
1990s. While the ODIHR was created as a very open body, the FSC has only recently begun 
to offer limited access. 
                                                 
14
 Among all IO bodies that are open, the correlation between depth and range of access is 0.54. All potential 
combinations of range and depth exist in the sample, but the most frequent arrangement is active and direct 
access combined with demanding selection criteria. 
15
 The variance of TNA access within IOs and across IOs is similar (Table A.1). 
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Figure 2. Variation in TNA Access within the UN, the ADB and the OSCE 
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Figure 2 can also be used to illustrate our index. For example, the UN ECOSOC in 2010 
received an index score of 2.4, based on three arrangements. One arrangement allows NGOs 
with consultative status (range = 2) to make statements at meetings (depth = 3) without 
additional restrictions (permanence = 1), as codified in Resolution 1996/31 (codification = 1). 
Similarly, the ADB Board of Governors received a score of 0.8 in 2010, equivalent to the 
sample mean, based on two arrangements. One of them originates from a policy paper 
(codification = 0.5), allowing accredited NGOs (range = 2) to participate in an NGO program 
parallel to annual meetings (depth = 2), but not lastingly (permanence = 0.5). 
 Previous research on civil society organizations (CSOs) in global governance, based on 
comparative case studies, has shown that the pattern of involvement varies across issue 
areas.16 Our data confirm this assessment. Figure 3 shows the development of TNA access for 
ten issue areas, where the index scores represent the mean of IO bodies by issue area at a 
particular point in time.17 In 2010, IO bodies in the field of human rights were by far the most 
open. Multi-issue bodies were the second most open category, followed by development and 
trade. The lowest levels of openness could be found in finance and security. 
  All issue areas have followed the same clear trend of an increase in openness over time, 
most notably after 1990. At a closer look, three additional patterns in the temporal 
development can be observed. First, IO bodies in human rights and development, as well as 
multi-issue bodies, have been pioneers of TNA access. Second, early differences in access 
have proven highly resilient over time, as IO bodies in some fields consistently have been the 
most open (human rights) or the most closed (security, finance). Third, unlike the overall 
trend of a steep increase from 1990 onwards, access in some fields, such as environmental 
politics and commodity regulation, grew more linearly. Other issue areas, such as trade and 
security, became more accessible later and abruptly.  
                                                 
16
 Steffek et al. 2008; Jönsson and Tallberg 2010. 
17
 Temporary decreases in access scores in Figures 3-5 are mainly the result of the new establishment of less 
accessible IO bodies. 
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Figure 3. TNA Access across Issue Areas, 1950-2010 (Index) 
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In addition, TNA access varies considerably across policy functions, as illustrated by 
Figure 4. IO bodies involved in monitoring and enforcement of member state compliance 
have been by far the most open category over the observation period. The second most open 
category in 2010, and during the first two decades of the observation period, was 
implementation bodies. Between 1970 and 1990, however, organizational bodies involved in 
policy formulation were more accessible than implementation bodies. Finally, the least open 
policy function in international cooperation has consistently been decision-making. Yet, even 
in this category, we see a strong increase in the level of TNA access between 1990 and 2010.
 Access also varies across world regions. TNA access in 2010 was most extensive in 
North and South American, European and global IOs, and less extensive in African and Asian 
IOs, even if the gap has decreased considerably in recent decades (Figure 5). 
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Figure 4. TNA Access across Policy Functions, 1950-2010 (Index) 
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Figure 5. TNA Access across World Regions, 1950-2010 (Index) 
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Explaining Transnational Access: Theories and Hypotheses 
 
The previous section showed that the trend toward greater access for TNAs spans all areas of 
global governance, while at the same time significant variation continues to exist across 
multiple dimensions. In this section, we first outline the conventional wisdom on the 
expansion of TNA involvement, and then present our own alternative argument.  
 
The Conventional Wisdom: A Global Participatory Norm 
 
The dominant explanation of TNA access in existing research privileges the emergence, 
spread, and consolidation of a participatory norm in global governance. This explanation is 
grounded in the constructivist notion that institutions reflect ideas and norms about what 
constitute appropriate and legitimate modes of governance. In this view, institutional design is 
a process where low priority is given to concerns of efficiency, compared to concerns of 
legitimacy. Norms define what institutional structures are appropriate in a given social 
community. Actors adapt to these institutional norms, either because they have internalized 
the norm as the “right thing to do,” or because they have learned what is expected of them.18 
The spread of norms about appropriate institutions gives rise to isomorphism, or the 
homogenization of institutional models across functional domains.19 
 According to this argument, recent decades have witnessed the emergence and spread of 
a new norm about what constitutes legitimate global governance.20 This norm conceives of 
TNAs as representatives of an emerging global civil society, whose integration into policy-
making can reduce the democratic deficits of IOs by strengthening participation, 
                                                 
18
 Checkel 2005, 804-805. On internalization of institutional norms, see March and Olsen 1989. On ceremonial 
adaptation to institutional norms, see Meyer and Rowan 1977. 
19
 Powell and DiMaggio 1991. 
20
 Drori et al. 2006 make a parallel argument at the national level, attributing the spread of openness and 
accountability practices across countries to the influence of a global norm of rationalized governance. 
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accountability, and transparency. While indirect representation through member governments 
was previously sufficient to legitimate IOs in democratic terms, the growing political 
authority of IOs requires that civil society becomes more directly involved in policy-making.  
 This argument comes in a “thick” and a “thin” constructivist version. Both are based 
primarily on case studies of a set of major IOs: the UN, the EU, and the large economic 
multilaterals. In the first version, member states and IO bureaucracies have introduced and 
expanded participatory arrangements because they have become socialized into believing in 
the normative appropriateness of this model. This argument is most frequently made in 
relation to the UN, where the participatory arrangements of ECOSOC, based on Article 71 of 
the UN Charter, are claimed to have established a powerful pro-NGO norm and “set a 
benchmark for other U.N. agencies.”21 Others emphasize how the norm of NGO involvement 
spread and became consolidated through the large UN conferences of the 1980s and 1990s.22 
As a consequence, participatory governance nowadays constitutes the appropriate standard in 
the UN: “[W]hereas before, arguments were needed to justify the involvement of non-
governmental actors in governance processes, now we face a reversal, so the pressure is there 
to justify the exclusion of non-state actors from governance processes, that is, to explain why 
the new norm of appropriate governance does not apply to the concrete case.”23  
 Environmental and development policy are two areas of global governance where the 
pro-NGO norm of the UN is claimed to have been particularly influential. In the 
environmental domain, the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 
involved a large number of CSOs, set up the inclusive United Nations Environmental 
Programme, and supposedly created a standard of openness for subsequent environmental 
                                                 
21
 Charnovitz 1997, 253. See also Weiss and Gordenker 1996; Willetts 2000. Saurugger (2010) makes a similar 
argument in relation to the EU. 
22
 Clark et al. 1998. 
23
 Brühl and Rosert 2009, 26. 
20 
 
conferences and negotiations.24 In the development field, scholars trace the emergence of the 
participatory norm to the 1980s, when an ideational shift occurred away from state-led 
development and toward society-centered development.25 The UN, through its Development 
Programme, was an early promoter of this norm and subsequent model for other IOs. 
 In the “thin” constructivist version of the argument, the shift toward TNA access in 
global governance does not reflect socialization of policy-makers into this participatory norm, 
as much as adaptation to it for purposes of organizational legitimation. According to this 
argument, legitimacy is necessary for IOs to exercise authority and command compliance.26 
Where the design of IOs is a source of popular contention, decision-makers may therefore 
adopt certain institutional features in order to secure legitimacy in relation to the external 
environment. Knowing what is prescribed by the prevailing norm, IO decision-makers “act in 
accordance with expectations, irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it.”27 In 
this vein, O’Brien et al. argue that public opposition was the principal reason why the IMF, 
the World Bank, and WTO began to open up: “Under increased pressure from some elements 
of civil society for transparency and accountability the institutions have in the 1990s 
embarked upon a strategy of incremental reform. The intent is to extend and universalize 
existing multilateralism while blunting opposition through coopting hostile groups.”28 
Kissling and Steffek reach a similar conclusion, inspired by findings on the WTO, 
highlighting an “increasing willingness of international organizations to turn to CSO 
participation in order to confront the external criticism of their perceived missing 
legitimacy.”29 
                                                 
24
 Conca 1996; Chambers 2005; Bäckstrand 2006. 
25
 Reimann 2006; Liese 2010. 
26
 Hurd 1999. 
27
 Checkel 2005, 804. 
28
 O’Brien et al. 2000, 4. 
29
 Kissling and Steffek 2008, 210-211. 
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 In a similar manner, recent research speaks of IO openness as a consequence of 
“politicization” in global governance.30 According to this argument, the conferral of 
increasing authority to IOs has subjected them to growing societal contestation. Prominent 
examples include the EU, the UN, the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF. One of the 
expected effects of such growing politicization is expansion in TNA access. As Zürn 
hypothesizes: “International institutions that are politicized respond by giving greater access 
to transnational non-state actors as a move to increase legitimacy.”31 
 Taken together, these variants of the conventional argument yield three complementary 
hypotheses. First, we would expect IO bodies to open up as the participatory norm grows 
stronger and spreads, regardless of whether IO policy-makers have internalized or adapted 
defensively to it (H1.1). Second, we would expect TNA access to be particularly high for IO 
bodies in policy areas and regions where the UN has engaged in participatory governance, 
reflecting its role as norm entrepreneur (H1.2). Third, we would expect TNA access to be 
especially high for IO bodies that have been challenged by civil society actors, are at risk of 
being challenged, or are highly politicized (H1.3). 
 
The Argument: Functional Demand, Domestic Democracy, and State Sovereignty 
 
The descriptive patterns identified earlier raise doubts about the extent to which the spread of 
a participatory norm can comprehensively explain TNA access. For instance, IO bodies 
offered access to TNAs even before the rise of a new participatory norm. Early differences in 
TNA access across issue areas, policy functions, and world regions have proven highly 
resilient over time. Access varies extensively within IOs, even though a participatory norm 
would lead us to expect more of a general organizational predisposition toward openness. 
                                                 
30
 Zürn 2012; Zürn et al. 2012. 
31
 Zürn 2012, 15. 
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These descriptive results lead us to develop an alternative argument about the factors that 
have driven and shaped TNA access to IOs. More specifically, we privilege a combination of 
three explanatory factors: functional demand for TNA resources and services, domestic 
democratic standards in the membership of IOs, and state concerns with national sovereignty. 
In the following, we outline the logic of each explanatory factor, and then explain how they 
come together in a distinct account of variation in TNA access. 
 The first explanatory factor emphasizes the expected benefits to states and IO 
bureaucracies of engaging TNAs. The logic is informed by rational functionalism, which 
explains institutional design by the benefits an institution is expected to produce.32 It is also 
conformant with resource-exchange theory, which suggests that organizations seek to acquire 
the resources they lack through exchange with actors in their environment.33 In line with this 
logic, we argue that IOs may offer TNAs access in anticipation of distinct functional gains. 
Whether TNAs can provide such gains or not is a product of the governance problems IOs 
confront.  
 Relative to other institutional solutions, the advantages of engaging TNAs are more 
pronounced where policy areas are technically complex, require local implementation, and 
present significant non-compliance incentives, and where the relevant information – policy 
expertise, implementation knowledge, and compliance information – is held by societal 
actors. Where these conditions apply, TNA involvement promises a more efficient and 
effective institutional solution than relying exclusively on state or supranational actors to 
assist IOs. TNAs are generally experts on the policy issues that most concern them (e.g., 
business associations), are better positioned to implement policy at the societal level (e.g., 
development NGOs), and have unique access to grass-root information on state violations 
(e.g., human rights watchdogs). 
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 More specifically, TNAs can offer valuable resources at three central stages of the 
policy process. To begin with, IOs may favor the inclusion of TNAs because they can provide 
valuable expertise at the stage of policy formulation. While many problems in global 
governance are characterized by uncertainty as regards policy options and effects, TNAs often 
specialize in collecting and providing policy information. Since this information generally is 
provided for free, it allows IOs to move research costs off-budget.34 In addition, IOs may 
engage TNAs to perform implementation services. Most programmatic activities of IOs 
require implementation on the ground for which they seldom are optimally adapted. 
Outsourcing implementation to TNAs with local knowledge and capacity to reach the target 
population holds the promise of greater policy and resource efficiency.35 Finally, IOs may 
offer access to TNAs in order to elicit their help in monitoring and enforcing compliance. 
International agreements frequently present states with non-compliance incentives. Where 
information on potential violations is decentralized, the monitoring of compliance from below 
by TNAs constitutes an effective and efficient alternative to oversight by IOs themselves.36 In 
decision-making, a corresponding functional advantage of TNA involvement is more difficult 
to identify. In fact, there may even be a disadvantage. As Raustiala notes: “When 
governments desire secrecy to air possible compromises, or are at the stage of logrolling once 
positions have solidified, they may find NGO participation undesirable or not useful.”37 
 The second explanatory factor highlights the influence of democracies within IOs as a 
source of TNA access. This factor has analytical affinities with recent work on domestic 
political regimes and international cooperation.38 It builds on the logic that states’ preferences 
on the institutional design of IOs can be influenced by the nature of their domestic political 
regimes. Depending on whether they are democracies or autocracies, states may favor certain 
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institutional design features. Given such regime-dependent differences in state preferences, 
the likelihood of these design features being adopted will vary across IOs depending on the 
composition of their membership. 
 The nature of domestic regimes can be expected to shape state preferences on the 
institutional design of IOs where design features tap into constitutive differences between 
democracies and autocracies. Such differences are free and fair elections, freedom of 
expression, transparency, accountability, rule of law, and an autonomous civil society. 
Extending such “democratic” features to IOs is likely to be a less radical step for democracies, 
since it mainly involves applying the same procedural standards to all levels of political 
organization. Two examples of this logic are the establishment of public information policies 
and accountability mechanisms in global governance, which existing research shows are more 
likely when an IO’s membership is democratic.39 
 We assume that TNA access constitutes such a “democratic” institutional feature on 
which democracies and autocracies are likely to have different preferences. Democratic 
governments are used to interaction with civil society actors in domestic politics, and 
therefore are more likely to prefer the inclusion of TNAs in global governance. Autocracies, 
by contrast, are likely to resist TNA access, regarding it as a channel whereby domestic 
opposition groups can bypass the control of the regime and join their international allies in 
criticizing its policies.40 By extension, we would expect IOs with democratic memberships to 
be more open to TNA involvement than IOs dominated by autocracies, and democratic 
transitions among an IO’s membership to generate growing openness over time. 
 While functional benefits and domestic democracy are the drivers of access in our 
argument, state concerns for national sovereignty is the constraint. Sovereignty costs are 
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frequently identified as restrictions on the delegation of authority from states to non-state 
actors.41 Sovereignty costs in this context result from reduced state control associated with the 
involvement of TNAs. Such sovereignty concerns can be assumed to vary across policy 
functions and issue areas.42 First, the sovereignty costs of TNA access should be particularly 
high in IO decision-making, where states adopt rules and principles, and in monitoring and 
enforcement, where states are held to their commitments and may face sanctions. Second, 
allowing TNAs access to policy-making should be perceived by states as more threatening in 
some issue areas than in others, for historical, cultural and functional reasons. The costs 
should be highest when issues touch on elements of Westphalian sovereignty, notably, the 
territory and relations between the state and its citizens. Such issues are external and internal 
security, foreign policy, and asylum and immigration. 
 We test the core logic of this argument through three hypotheses – one for each 
explanatory factor. First, we would expect higher TNA access for IO bodies engaged in 
governance tasks that are technically complex, require local programmatic activities, and 
present significant non-compliance incentives (H2.1). Second, we would expect higher TNA 
access for IO bodies in organizations with more democratic memberships (H2.2). Third, we 
would expect lower access for IO bodies involved in policy functions and issue areas 
associated with high sovereignty costs (H2.3).  
 In the following sections, we demonstrate how these three factors together provide the 
best comprehensive explanation of TNA access. We argue that the functional advantages of 
openness not only explain a central part of the expansion of access over time, as international 
cooperation has shifted toward governance problems that generate a stronger demand for 
TNA resources, but also persistent variation across policy functions and issue areas. The level 
of domestic democracy in the membership of IOs is also important to explaining the growing 
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openness in global governance, following processes of national democratization, as well as 
variation across IOs and world regions in the readiness to engage with TNAs. The principal 
constraint on the expansion of TNA access are the sovereignty costs to states of reduced 
political control, which have contributed to variation in openness across policy functions and 
issue areas. 
 More specifically, we argue that these factors yield a two-stage account of the over-time 
development, reflected in the descriptive patterns identified earlier. All three factors have 
been at play in both periods, but with different intensity. During the period of 1950-1990, 
functional benefits of TNA involvement meant that IOs limited access to TNAs where there 
was a clear functional need for their input. This translated into access in areas such as human 
rights and development, and in monitoring and enforcement. In parallel, domestic 
commitments to democracy led Western IOs to emerge as leaders in openness. Yet, 
throughout this period, state concerns with national sovereignty worked as a strong 
counterweight to functional and democratic pressures for IO openness. The effects were 
particularly prominent in the policy function and the issue area most closely associated with 
Westphalian sovereignty: decision-making and international security. In all, this led to TNA 
access which was on average quite low by today’s standards. 
 From about 1990 onwards, TNA access to IOs expanded dramatically. The end of the 
Cold War acted as a catalyst that transformed global governance with consequences for TNA 
access (Figure 1). First, the end of the Cold War reinforced functional demand for the 
resources and services of TNA, as states broadened and deepened cooperation. In IOs that had 
been paralyzed by East-West tensions, the end of the Cold War removed political blockages 
and enabled states to set new policy ambitions.43 In some areas of the world, it created space 
for ethnic tensions and conflicts to erupt, calling for IOs to act in new capacities, including 
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conflict prevention, humanitarian interventions, and post-conflict management.44 In parallel, 
the ousting of authoritarian regimes was followed by unstable processes of democratic 
transition, calling for greater IO involvement in the monitoring of elections and human 
rights.45 These developments generated higher access to IO bodies involved in 
implementation and monitoring, and in human rights and security. Second, the end of the 
Cold War brought about the democratization of many former authoritarian states.46 In many 
IOs, this shifted the political balance in favor of greater openness, as the resistance of former 
authoritarian states to TNA involvement weakened, contributing to greater openness in 
formerly less democratic regions. Third, state commitments to sovereignty softened post-
1989, reflected in a weakening of the principles of non-intervention and interstate 
cooperation.47 While sovereignty concerns remained an important constraint on the extension 
of access, they did so with less intensity. 
 
 
Determinants of TNA Access: A Multivariate Analysis 
 
We now proceed to the multivariate assessment of the sources of variation in TNA access. We 
begin by briefly describing the measurements and models we use, before we turn to the 
results. 
 
Operationalization and Model Specification 
We assess the effects of a growing participatory norm (H1.1) based on the variable 
participatory discourse. Using the Google ngram tool, which includes over five million 
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publications from the Google books database, we develop an indicator that measures the 
strength of a participatory discourse based on references to the terms “democratic deficit,” 
“participatory governance” and “global democracy” in scientific and non-scientific English-
speaking publications.48 The annual number of publications that include these terms are 
summarized into a common variable.49 To avoid potential endogeneity and ensure that this 
variable represents the spread of a norm, participatory discourse is a lagged variable. While it 
is difficult to generalize how long a norm takes to spread, some scholars argue that 
socialization takes three to five years to observe.50 A comparison of different time lags reveals 
that the effect of participatory discourse on the dependent variable is most pronounced 
between two and three years.51 For these reasons, we operate with a three-year lag.  
 We test the effect of the UN as a norm leader (H1.2) through the indicator UN 
conferences. Based on our data collection from research articles, conference reports, and UN 
documents, this variable measures whether the UN held special conferences in the same issue 
area or region as an IO body.52 It includes information on 51 UN conferences between 1954 
and 2009. The data are weighted by the number of official TNA representatives, since the 
effect of these events on the spread of a participatory norm is likely to be stronger if the 
number of participants is high. We also apply a time lag to test for a socialization effect. A 
comparison of different lags reveals that the effect of this variable is strongest after three to 
four years.53 Thus, our variable combines a three- and a four-year lag. 
 We assess H1.3 through three variables intended to capture different aspects of 
challenges by civil society actors. First, we measure the effect of a direct challenge through 
                                                 
48
 Michel et al. 2010. This indicator is very highly correlated (0.83) with an alternative indicator, based on 
newspaper articles in the LexisNexis database, suggesting that our indicator is not biased as a result of scholarly 
fads or TNA publications. 
49
 For the descriptive statistics of our independent variables, see Table A.1. 
50
 Bearce and Bondanella 2007, 716; Zürn and Checkel 2005, 1066. 
51
 Bearce and Bondanella 2007, 724. See Figure A.2 for a plot of different time lags.  
52
 See Figures 3 and 5 for our categorization of issue area and region. This indicator varies within multi-issue 
IOs. 
53
 Results for different time lags are available from the authors upon request. 
29 
 
the indicator protests against IO. It captures media coverage of protests, assuming that 
protests making the news will lead decision-makers to be concerned about the perceived 
legitimacy of an IO.54 The data for this indicator were generated from the LexisNexis 
academic database and include 6,270 articles from 80 daily newspapers in the category 
“world major newspaper” from 1960 to 2010. The articles were identified through keyword 
references to “demonstrator” and “protestor,” combined with the name of the organization.55 
We apply a three-year decreasing lag, assuming that the pressure for a strategic response will 
be strongest directly after the protest and weaken over time. We logarithmize the scale to limit 
the effect of outliers, such as the UN and the WTO. Second, building on the same data, we 
assess the risk of being challenged with the variable protests against similar IOs, by which we 
mean IOs in the same policy area or world region.56 We use the average scores for the media 
coverage of protests against IOs within ten policy areas and five regions, and apply the same 
decreasing three-year lag. Third, we assume that the visibility of an IO body in media 
coverage indicates the extent to which this body is politicized. We measure visibility in mass 
media using data compiled from LexisNexis. Based on the number of references to IO bodies 
in the New York Times and Le Monde, we use a three-step scale of many, few and no 
references to categorize each IO body’s coverage in the media.57 These two newspapers 
complement each other’s regional focus. More than one third of the 298 IO bodies in our 
sample are mentioned. In a second step, we use references to the IO as a weighting factor to 
represent the overtime variation.58 
 The hypothesis H2.1 refers to the nature of governance tasks. We expect higher access 
for IO bodies that engage in tasks that are technically complex, require local activities, and 
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present significant non-compliance incentives. We coded all 298 IO bodies according to these 
three dimensions, based on the description of their tasks in official documents and self-
presentations.  For each of the dimensions, we construct an indicator with a three-step scale, 
ranging from “not relevant”, to “somewhat relevant” and “highly relevant.” In line with the 
underlying theoretical logic, the coding for each body is based on a combined assessment of 
the policy function and issue area in which it is active.59 
 We test H2.2 based on an indicator that measures the average level of democracy in 
each IO’s membership. Polity IV scores on “institutionalized democracy” from the Correlates 
of War dataset are used as weights for the COW-IGO data on membership in international 
organizations, which we updated for 2010 and adapted to our sample.60 We add a one-year 
temporal lag to avoid representing the reverse effect of IOs affecting domestic political 
liberalization.61 
 Third, to assess H2.3 we use two dummy variables; one measures whether a body is a 
decision-making body and the other if the body is involved in the field of security. We assume 
that the sovereignty costs of TNA access are higher for decision-making bodies and bodies in 
the field of security. 
 In addition, we include four control variables. First, some existing research argues that 
IOs with extensive resource deficits will have stronger incentives to involve TNAs.62 For this 
reason, we include the variable IO budget as an indicator of organizational resources.63 These 
data were collected from IO websites, annual reports, direct contacts with the IOs, and the 
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Yearbook of International Organizations.64 We measure budget in millions of Euros for 2010. 
The scale of the variable is logarithmized to normalize the effect of outliers. 
 Second, previous research suggests that member states vary in their support for TNA 
access, and that openness reforms are more likely when states have homogeneous 
preferences.65 Accordingly, we control for preference heterogeneity with the variable affinity 
of member states. Using data on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly from the 
Affinity of Nations index, this variable captures the yearly average affinity of all pairwise 
combinations of member states of each IO in our sample.66  
 Third, we control for power asymmetries, based on the idea that major powers carry 
more influence within IOs and will seek to promote or oppose TNAs depending on their 
preferences. The most prominent pattern, according to existing literature, is that major 
Western powers appear as defenders of TNAs, while major communist or authoritarian 
powers oppose their involvement.67 We use an indicator that combines information on 
whether an IO has a major power in its membership with information on the domestic regimes 
of those powers.68 The result is a democratic major power dummy for IOs that have at least 
one democratic major or regional power, but no undemocratic major or regional power that 
we can assume would veto access. 
 Finally, we assess whether the supply or availability of TNAs affects the extent to 
which they are granted access.69 For these purposes, we construct the variable TNA supply, 
which features time-series data on the broad set of NGOs accredited to the UN ECOSOC.70 
The indicator is based on the assumption that the number of NGOs accredited to ECOSOC 
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fairly represents the worldwide population of TNAs. While the UN refers to NGOs rather than 
TNAs, its definition of NGOs is very close to that of TNAs in substantive terms.71 We 
disaggregate the data to measure the strength of the TNA supply by world regions, based on 
each NGO’s country of registration. This variable thus indicates the average number of NGOs 
in the relevant regional reference group. To avoid endogeneity, we lag the variable by one 
year. 
 We test our hypotheses using Tobit regression analysis. Our choice of a Tobit model is 
driven by both methodological and theoretical considerations. First, we are equally interested 
in the likelihood and the degree of openness, and assume that our explanatory variables affect 
both dimensions. Second, deciding what level of access TNAs will be granted is usually made 
at the same time as the decision to open up a body. These two decisions are rarely made in a 
sequential way. Third, our dependent variable shows the distribution of a corner solution, and 
is left-censored at zero. The discrete component of this variable – whether or not the value 
equals zero – indicates if a body provides access to TNAs. The continuous component, or all 
values greater than zero, represents the degree of TNA access for the average of all 
participatory arrangements per body.72 With a logarithmic scale that limits the effect of 
outliers, the dependent variable follows an almost symmetric, bell-shaped distribution (Figure 
A.1). A Tobit estimator thus avoids the bias of an OLS model for left-censored data, and 
enables us to exploit information from the theoretically relevant zero entries. We cluster 
standard errors at the body level to account for potential dependence between units. 
 We estimate a series of five Tobit models, as shown in Table 2, using the average scores 
of all participatory arrangements per IO body. Our three principal models use the index of 
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TNA access as dependent variable. Model 1 estimates the effects for the full observation 
period 1950-2010, while Models 2 and 3 estimate the effects for the periods before and after 
1990, respectively, to explore the possibility of a structural change in the explanation of TNA 
access. Recall that 1990 was identified as a turning point in the descriptive data (Figure 1). 
We display the estimated marginal effects of the independent variables in Model 1 in Figure 
6. Moving beyond the index, we also estimate separate models for the depth (Model 4) and 
the range (Model 5) of access to assess whether the effects of the independent variables vary 
across the two main dimensions of TNA access. 
 
Results 
 
What explains variation in TNA access across IO bodies? We first discuss the findings from 
Models 1 to 3 for each of the two alternative arguments and the control variables, before we 
report the findings from Models 4 and 5. 
 The analysis grants only limited support to the argument that IOs have opened up as a 
result of the spread of a global participatory norm. These results suggest that the findings 
from case studies of the UN, the EU, and the large multilateral economic organizations do not 
extend to the broad universe of IOs. The strongest results are found for H1.1, where the 
analysis reveals that participatory discourse has a positive and significant statistical effect on 
TNA access, except for the time before 1990, suggesting that its influence is concentrated to 
the period after the end of the Cold War. In addition, this variable has a strong marginal effect 
on TNA access, as shown in Figure 6 (0.1319). However, there are two important limitations 
to the explanatory power of this variable. First, this factor cannot account for the increasing 
cross-sectional variation over time. Second, although the time lag reduces the risk of a bias 
from academic fads and publications by TNAs themselves in the measurement of the  
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Table 2. Tobit Regression of TNA Access 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Index Index, 
before 
1990 
Index, 
after 1990 
Depth Range 
Participatory discourse  0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(3.76)** (0.48) (3.67)** (3.25)** (3.57)** 
UN conferences 0.0031 -0.0044 0.0025 0.0031 0.0033 
(0.96) (0.42) (0.95) (1.17) (1.27) 
Protests against IO (ln) 0.0239 0.2604 0.0052 0.0151 0.0223 
(1.27) (4.77)** (0.28) (1.04) (1.56) 
Protests against similar 
IOs (ln) 
0.0393 0.0741 0.0353 0.0236 0.0304 
(2.30)* (2.57)* (1.77) (1.72) (2.35)* 
Media coverage (ln) 0.0094 0.0009 0.0117 0.0010 0.0093 
(0.83) (0.06) (1.07) (0.12) (1.10) 
Technical complexity -0.0387 -0.0315 -0.0384 -0.0219 -0.0124 
(0.84) (0.48) (0.91) (0.64) (0.38) 
Local activity 0.1111 -0.1379 0.2022 0.0478 0.1349 
(1.79) (1.28) (3.36)** (1.12) (2.96)** 
Non-compliance 
incentives 
0.2075 0.0932 0.2476 0.1355 0.1426 
(3.41)** (1.02) (4.18)** (3.19)** (3.37)** 
Level of democracy 0.0316 0.0376 0.0326 0.0253 0.0206 
(4.30)** (3.39)** (4.43)** (4.31)** (3.85)** 
Decision-making  -0.1866 -0.3359 -0.1032 -0.1516 -0.1073 
(1.87) (2.39)* (1.11) (2.10)* (1.48) 
Security -0.6719 -1.0147 -0.5711 -0.5345 -0.4567 
(3.96)** (2.65)** (4.17)** (4.46)** (3.24)** 
IO budget 0.0350 -0.0274 0.0324 0.0335 0.0261 
(1.94) (0.91) (1.84) (2.36)* (1.89) 
Affinity of member states -0.1425 -0.0572 -0.1951 -0.0739 -0.0339 
(0.69) (0.17) (0.92) (0.44) (0.21) 
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Democratic major power  0.0571 0.3494 -0.0223 0.0127 0.0250 
(0.71) (3.15)** (0.28) (0.22) (0.40) 
TNA supply (ln) -0.0241 -0.1125 0.0251 0.0097 -0.0042 
(0.51) (2.06)* (0.50) (0.29) (0.11) 
Constant -0.6241 -0.6732 -0.6495 -0.9202 -0.8958 
 (12.90)** (8.40)** (13.46)** (18.36)** (18.03)** 
N 6,786 2,316 4,470 6,786 6,786 
Wald Chi2 164.90 105.78 185.82 168.28 162.57 
Log pseudolikelihood -4935.40 -1409.57 -3313.39 -3866.61 -3947.83 
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 Tobit regression (intreg, STATA 11). Estimations clustered by panel identifier (IO body). 
Robust standard errors are used to compute Z statistics in all regressions. 
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Figure 6. Marginal Effects for Tobit Regression of TNA Access (Index), Model 1 
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discourse, we cannot preclude that the indicator partially represents a broader time trend and 
the salience of the empirical phenomenon of TNA access. 
 The analysis provides less support for the other two hypotheses testing the conventional 
wisdom. The results for UN conferences (H1.2) suggest that the UN has not been a norm 
entrepreneur, since the effect is not significant in any of the three main models. Although 
these UN events often addressed issues that we nowadays associate with high TNA access, 
such as development, environment and human rights (Figure 3), UN  conferences have not 
generated today’s openness by inspiring IO bodies in related regions or issue areas to adopt 
participatory arrangements.  
 The hypothesis that TNA access would be especially high for IO bodies that have been 
or are at risk of being challenged by civil society actors (H1.3) receives weak support. The 
variable protests against IO is only significant before 1990. However, protests were 
extremely rare during this period, so the finding contradicts the theoretical expectation. 
Descriptive data on this variable show that protests peaked around the year 2000, about a 
decade after TNA access began to expand strongly, and generally have targeted global, 
economic IOs. Challenges from civil society actors thus cannot explain the broad opening up 
of IOs in global governance. In comparison, there is slightly more support for an indirect 
influence of protest. The variable protests against similar IOs has a positive and significant 
effect on TNA access for the full observation period, even if the marginal effect is relatively 
weak (0.0906) and the level of significance low. While it is puzzling that this factor is 
statistically significant before 1990, but not after, the results nevertheless indicate that protests 
may have led non-targeted IOs to take preventive action. Finally, the variable media coverage 
is not significant in any of the three models. This suggests that IOs which are more 
politicized, and therefore more vulnerable to challenges by civil society, are not more likely to 
open up to TNAs. 
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 The analysis grants extensive support to the argument that functional demand, domestic 
democracy, and state sovereignty jointly explain TNA access. For two of the three variables 
measuring functional demand (H2.1), the results are positive, especially for the time period 
after 1990. The increase in access over the past two decades has been significantly influenced 
by the expected benefits from TNA involvement. We find a statistically significant positive 
effect of local activity on TNA access from 1990 onwards, testifying to the attraction of TNA 
involvement for IO bodies with on-the-ground implementation. The absence of a similar 
effect for the full observation period is explained by the presence of a negative effect before 
1990, when access to IO bodies with local implementation was an exception.  
 The positive relationship between local implementation and TNA access in recent 
decades is illustrated by the experience of the ADB. While the ADB’s Management, 
responsible for project implementation, initially did not offer formal access, this body began 
to open up in the late 1980s, when the Bank shifted its attention from state-led to social 
development (Figure 2). From then on, TNAs were seen as important partners, since they had 
“valuable experience and expertise on local conditions and realistic perception of constraints 
and prospects.”73 For instance, TNAs assisted the Bank by promoting community awareness 
and participation, providing health services and vocational training, and serving as 
microfinance conduits.74 Building on its positive experiences, the Management subsequently 
expanded openness during the 1990s and 2000s. 
 Likewise, we find a strong positive and statistically significant effect of non-compliance 
incentives on TNA access for the full observation period. The marginal effect (0.0992) 
demonstrates that demand for compliance monitoring is one of the strongest predictors of 
TNA access. Assessing the time periods before and after 1990 separately, it becomes clear 
that this effect is particularly strong after 1990. This finding corroborates research that 
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emphasizes functional reasons for private access to a new generation of international courts 
emerging after the end of the Cold War.75 As an illustration, the International Criminal Court 
– the IO in our sample with the highest access level in 2010 – relies extensively on TNAs to 
monitor compliance. According to Article 44 of the Rome Statute, any organizational body of 
the ICC, such as the Office of the Prosecutor or judicial chambers, can receive assistance in 
its work from experts, including from NGOs.  
 In contrast to the two previous indicators of functional demand, technical complexity is 
not significant in any of the three index models. This indicates that IOs do not open up to 
TNAs primarily to benefit from their technical expertise. One explanation could be that IOs 
instead internalize the solution to this demand through the creation of bodies with specific 
technical or scientific tasks. In the International Whaling Commission, for instance, the 
Scientific Committee is composed of member state experts, which reduces the body’s demand 
for external scientific expertise.76 
 H2.2 on the influence of domestic political regimes receives very strong empirical 
support. Level of democracy is positive and significant across all three index models. In 
addition, it has the strongest positive marginal effect on access among all independent 
variables (0.1533). A comparison of different time lags shows higher coefficients for short 
lags, suggesting a rather rapid effect of domestic democratization on TNA access at the 
international level (Figure A.2). The OSCE stands out as an example where democratization 
among member states has led to an extensive expansion of openness (Figure 2). For example, 
the OSCE’s Conference on the Human Dimension (and later Human Dimension 
Implementation Meeting) opened up to NGOs in the early 1990s, after former Soviet states 
became newfound proponents of access.77 
                                                 
75 Alter 2006. 
76Andresen and Skodvin 2003; Tallberg et al. forthcoming, Ch. 6. 
77Tallberg et al. forthcoming, Ch. 5; Brett 1993. 
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 The analysis also offers firm support for the effect of sovereignty costs on TNA access 
(H2.3). The variable decision-making has a significant negative effect on TNA access before 
1990. As shown in Figure 4, even decision-making bodies have begun to open up in recent 
years, explaining the absence of an effect after 1990 and for the full observation period. In 
addition, there is a strong statistically significant negative effect for security across all index 
models. The marginal effect for this variable (-0.1938) shows that engagement in security 
strongly reduces the level of openness of an IO body. Figure 2 illustrates how security bodies, 
such as the OSCE’s FSC, often are the least accessible parts of multi-issue IOs. Similar results 
are obtained for the UN Security Council and NATO’s North Atlantic Council. 
 Finally, we consider the effects of the control variables. IO budget does not have a 
significant effect in any of the index models. Neither does the analysis grant any support for 
preference heterogeneity as a constraint on the openness of IO bodies, since affinity of 
member states is not significant in any of the models. The results for the variable democratic 
major power reveal an interesting pattern. We find that the presence of a democratic major 
power in the membership of an IO has a significant positive effect on the openness of its 
bodies before 1990, but not after. While the relative power of advocates and opponents of 
TNA access thus mattered before the end of the Cold War, the strong increase in openness 
since 1990 has not been driven by power differentials. Finally, we conclude that the supply or 
availability of TNAs does not influence their access to IO bodies. While TNA supply has a 
statistically significant negative effect on access before 1990, this relationship is contrary to 
the theoretical expectation. Moreover, descriptive data show that the major increase in the 
worldwide NGO population lagged behind the opening up of IOs, suggesting that 
participatory arrangements are not the products of NGO demands but instead create 
opportunity structures and encourage TNAs to mobilize. 
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 Do these results from the composite index hold for the separate dimensions of depth and 
range of access as well, or are they potentially governed by different logics? With a few 
exceptions, the results are the same as for our index models and identical across the two 
dimensions (Models 4 and 5). Participatory discourse, non-compliance incentives, level of 
democracy, and security have a statistically significant effect on both depth and range. 
Likewise, there is no support in either model for UN conferences, protests against IO, media 
coverage, technical complexity, affinity of member states, democratic major power, and TNA 
supply. Yet we observe interesting variation in four instances. First, the variable protests 
against similar IOs has a positive and significant effect on the range of access, but not on the 
depth, lending some support to the notion that protests have led non-targeted IOs to seek 
legitimacy through access to a broad range of TNAs. Second, local activity has a positive and 
significant influence on range but not depth, suggesting that IOs seek input from a broad set 
of actors when engaged in on-the-ground implementation. Third, decision-making has a 
significant negative effect on the depth of TNA access, but not the range of actors invited. 
When decision-making bodies grant access, it tends to be shallow, as in the case of the WTO 
Ministerial Conference. Fourth, IO budget has a weak positive significant effect on the depth 
of access, but not the range. This suggests that IO bodies are more likely to offer deep access 
when they have sufficient resources to manage the costs of accreditation and participation. 
 In sum, the multivariate analysis points to strong explanatory power for the three factors 
of our argument: functional demand for TNA resources and services, the domestic democratic 
standards of IO memberships, and the sovereignty costs of TNA access. IO bodies are more 
likely to engage TNAs when involved in policies that require local implementation and 
monitoring of compliance, and when their member states are committed domestically to 
principles of liberal democracy, but less likely to invite TNAs where this would entail 
extensive sovereignty costs. While the effect of domestic democracy has remained strong 
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throughout the entire time period, the effect of functional demand has increased over time, 
and the effect of sovereignty costs decreased. By contrast, we find less support for the 
explanation that a global participatory norm has pushed IOs toward greater openness through 
processes of socialization or organizational legitimation. However, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the growing strength of a participatory discourse has shaped the over-time trend 
in TNA access. 
 
Robustness Checks 
We also estimated a series of alternative models (Tables 3 and 4) to check the robustness of 
our results. First, we controlled for potential effects of our new index and the Tobit 
specification, by estimating a logit model with a binary dependent variable that indicates if an 
IO body is open or not (Models 6-8). The results reveal a very similar pattern to those 
previously reported, with strong support for non-compliance incentives, local activity (after 
1990), level of democracy, decision-making (before 1990), and security. The same can be 
observed for democratic major power and, with the same caveat as above, participatory 
discourse. However, three results diverge. Protests against similar IOs does not remain 
statistically significant in this analysis. The effect of IO budget is significant in Model 6, 
suggesting that IO resources affect the decision to grant access, but not the level of access. 
We find a strong positive effect of TNA supply for the period after 1990, suggesting that the 
existence of a large NGO population has influenced the likelihood of access, but not its level, 
during the past two decades (Model 8). 
 Second, we estimated a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model (Model 9). 
For this purpose, we transformed our dependent variable into a five-scale count variable with 
values from 0 to 4, to control for potential effects of the Tobit estimation of our index. Table 3 
shows that this specification leads to highly similar results. 
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 Third, we estimated a biased OLS model with fixed-year effects as an additional point 
of reference. This analysis, too, produced very similar results for the main variables (Model 
10).   
 Fourth, we controlled for the effects of our decision to operate with IO bodies as the 
unit of analysis, and re-estimated Models 1, 2 and 3 at the IO level (Models 11-13).78 
Although some variables are more difficult to interpret after the aggregation, the analysis 
corroborates the body-level results on non-compliance incentives (after 1990), level of 
democracy, decision-making, security and, with the same reservation, participatory discourse. 
Fifth, we added a series of dummy variables on world regions and policy areas to 
assess if they have an effect beyond other covariates. Model 14, which includes only these 
dummies, indicates a significant negative effect on access for Africa, Asia, finance and 
security, as well as a positive effect of human rights (Table 4). However, adding these 
dummies to Model 1 does not affect the principal results. As shown in Model 15, the 
significance of the regional dummies disappears, since they are correlated with the level of 
democracy. The effect of IO bodies involved in finance, security, and human rights decreases, 
but remains significant, pointing to the existence of issue-specific determinants of TNA 
access beyond the general mechanisms in the core model. 
 Taken together, these models suggest that the principal results from the Tobit analysis 
are robust regarding the influence of functional demand, domestic democracy and sovereignty 
concerns. 
                                                 
78
 The results of Model 11 are highly similar to a re-estimation of Model 1 clustered by IOs instead of IO bodies. 
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Table 3. Robustness Checks 
  
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
  
Logit, Openness a Count, 
Index b 
OLS, 
Index c 
Tobit, Index, IO-leveld 
  
All Before 
1990 
After 
1990 
All All All Before 
1990 
After 
1990 
Participatory 
discourse 
 
0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 
 
(2.50)* (0.05) (2.17)* (4.44)** (2.34)* (1.57) (0.55) (2.15)* 
UN conferences 
 
0.0044 -0.0160 0.0033 0.0021 -0.0022 0.0049 0.0008 0.0048 
 
(0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.51) (1.65) (0.16) (1.57) 
Protests against 
IO (ln) 
 
0.1028 0.8204 0.0468 -0.0044 0.0127 0.0153 0.0939 -0.0031 
 
(1.22) (3.32)** (0.57) (0.08) (1.01) (0.85) (1.86) (0.17) 
Protests against 
similar IOs (ln) 
 
0.0608 0.1911 0.0427 0.1335 0.0286 0.0193 0.0333 0.0297 
 
(0.97) (1.60) (0.58) (2.85)** (2.85)** (1.15) (1.78) (1.50) 
Media coverage 
(ln) 
 
-0.0181 -0.0501 -0.0029 0.0839 0.0100 -0.0040 -0.0117 0.0177 
 
(0.46) (0.99) (0.07) (2.11)* (1.37) (0.18) (0.60) (0.57) 
Technical 
complexity 
 
-0.0230 -0.1002 0.0341 -0.1463 -0.0332 -0.1409 -0.1568 -0.1163 
 
(0.13) (0.41) (0.19) (0.94) (1.20) (1.56) (1.56) (1.14) 
Local activity 
 
0.1382 -0.9106 0.6128 0.4611 0.0704 0.0926 -0.1882 0.2492 
 
(0.58) (2.15)* (2.28)* (2.93)** (1.83) (0.57) (1.08) (1.46) 
Non-compliance 
incentives 
 
0.5756 0.0799 0.8497 0.5201 0.1681 0.2703 0.3435 0.2901 
 
(2.25)* (0.21) (2.82)** (3.70)** (3.62)** (1.79) (1.34) (1.97)* 
Level of 
democracy 
 
0.1020 0.1394 0.1000 0.1094 0.0165 0.0194 0.0165 0.0215 
 
(3.84)** (3.39)** (3.44)** (4.31)** (4.55)** (2.85)** (2.15)* (2.95)** 
Decision-making  
 
-0.6004 -1.3030 -0.2294 -0.5623 -0.0990 -0.5799 -0.7645 -0.2835 
 
(1.66) (2.48)* (0.65) (1.67) (1.78) (2.43)* (3.10)** (1.02) 
Security 
 
-2.1581 -3.8866 -1.8524 -1.4724 -0.3180 -0.5013 -0.4842 -0.4845 
 
(3.40)** (1.82) (3.83)** (2.55)* (5.27)** (3.32)** (2.43)* (3.20)** 
IO budget 
 
0.1587 -0.0002 0.1347 0.0449 0.0156 0.0118 -0.0127 0.0058 
 
(2.23)* (0.00) (1.96)* (0.90) (1.51) (0.57) (0.60) (0.24) 
Affinity of 
member states 
 
-0.7113 -0.3727 -1.0834 -0.4737 -0.1378 0.0041 0.0098 -0.0412 
 
(0.83) (0.25) (1.37) (1.28) (1.11) (0.02) (0.04) (0.18) 
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Democratic 
major power  
 
0.2215 1.4230 -0.2096 0.0963 0.0383 -0.0216 0.0898 -0.0753 
 
(0.74) (2.90)** (0.70) (0.43) (0.83) (0.26) (1.02) (0.82) 
TNA supply (ln) 
 
0.1382 -0.2258 0.4102 -0.2361 -0.0286 0.0344 0.0272 0.0184 
 
(0.80) (0.94) (2.11)* (1.85) (1.04) (0.71) (0.54) (0.30) 
Constant 
 
-2.6902 -0.1322 -4.8565 -2.1839 0.0549 -1.3410 -1.5536 -1.3347 
 
(2.40)* (0.08) (3.57)** (2.83)** (0.36) (11.68)** (9.09)** (12.45)** 
N 
 
6,786 2,316 4,470 6780 6,786 1,425 546 879 
Wald Chi2 
 
88.47 67.82 97.38 250.99 
 
111.82 82.36 121.49 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
 
-3893.15 -1178.26 -2511.25 -3677.97 
 
-400.93 -103.60 -219.08 
R2 
     
0.29 
   
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 a Logistic regression of binary dependent variable (open/not open)  b Negative binomial 
regression (nbreg) with count version of the index as dependent variable  with a five-stage scale from 0 to 4.  c OLS 
regression with year fixed-effects  d Tobit regression (intreg, STATA 11) at IO level. Estimations clustered by panel 
identifier (IO body). Robust standard errors are used to compute Z statistics in all regressions. 
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Table 4. Effects of World Regions and Policy Areas 
 14 15 
 Tobit, Index Tobit, Indexa 
Africa -0.3370 -0.1138 
 (2.97)** (0.81) 
Americas -0.0234 0.1045 
 (0.26) (0.96) 
Asia -0.2481 -0.1934 
 (2.32)* (1.76) 
Europe 0.0134 0.0340 
 (0.15) (0.33) 
Commodities -0.0198 0.0412 
 (0.15) (0.29) 
Social affairs 0.0210 0.1572 
 (0.20) (1.44) 
Development -0.1962 -0.1760 
 (1.18) (1.25) 
Environment -0.1186 -0.0866 
 (0.98) (0.78) 
Finance -0.6690 -0.6313 
 (4.06)** (4.38)** 
Human rights 0.6991 0.4055 
 (6.86)** (3.04)** 
Security  -0.6297 -0.6745 
 (3.83)** (3.98)** 
Technology -0.2189 -0.0696 
 (1.67) (0.56) 
Trade -0.0413 -0.1381 
 (0.39) (1.39) 
Participatory discourse  0.0001 
  (3.56)** 
Local activity   0.1275 
  (2.11)* 
Non-compliance incentives  0.1277 
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  (2.14)* 
Level of democracy  0.0204 
  (2.21)* 
IO budget  0.0392 
  (2.36)* 
Constant -0.4897 -0.6932 
 (10.63)** (14.47)** 
Wald Chi2 139.88 254.66 
Log pseudolikelihood -7079.61 -4571.44 
N 9,007 6,786 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 Tobit regression (intreg, STATA 11). Estimations clustered by panel identifier (IO body). 
Robust standard errors are used to compute Z statistics in all regressions. a Only significant covariates from 
Model 1 shown. 
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Conclusion 
 
The opening up of international organizations to TNAs is one of the most profound changes in 
global governance over recent decades. This article contributes to our understanding of this 
development by descriptively mapping central patterns in TNA access since 1950 and 
assessing the sources of variation through a multivariate analysis. Our conclusion briefly 
summarizes the findings of the analysis and expands on their implications for the study of 
global governance. 
 Our argument can be summarized in terms of three principal conclusions. First, IOs 
have indeed undergone a profound institutional transformation over past decades, 
dramatically expanding the opportunities for TNAs to participate in global policy-making. If 
anything, our exclusive focus on formal TNA access underestimates this change, since many 
IOs offer informal mechanisms of access as well. This is a development that spans all issue 
areas, policy functions, and world regions. Still, significant differences remain, as TNA access 
continues to vary in distinct and durable ways. Second, variation in TNA access is best 
explained by a combination of three principal factors. The functional advantages of including 
TNAs account for a central part of the expansion of access over time, as international 
cooperation has shifted toward more demanding governance problems, and for variation 
across issue areas and policy functions, both across and within IOs. The level of domestic 
democracy in the membership of IOs is an important additional source of growing openness 
and helps to explain variation across IOs and world regions as a result of democratization. 
The principal constraint on the expansion of TNA access has been the sovereignty costs to 
states, which have contributed to variation across issue areas and policy functions. Together, 
these factors yield a two-stage account of the opening up of IOs, with the end of the Cold War 
acting as a dividing event and catalyst for change. Third, the tendency of existing research to 
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focus on developments in a specific set of major IOs has biased the understanding of TNA 
access. While many prominent contributions have concluded that IOs open up as a result of a 
participatory norm, an assessment of a broad sample of IOs for an extended period of time 
yields different results. What was claimed to be a general phenomenon constituted a relatively 
rare occurrence, primarily influencing TNA access in a select number of large regional or 
global IOs. 
 Expanding the perspective beyond its results on TNA access, this article generates 
implications for three areas of research on global governance. The first is the literature on 
international institutional design. Existing research tends to highlight the reasons why IOs are 
resistant to change. Changing the constitutional rules of IOs invariably involves demanding 
institutional hurdles.79 The capacity of IO bodies to implement institutional changes on their 
own is normally circumscribed by states’ interest in matching delegation with control.80 The 
organizational cultures of IOs often have a stabilizing effect by defining appropriate 
institutional practices.81 Once in place, institutional rules tend to become self-reinforcing, by 
structuring expectations, presenting adaptation costs, and generating positive feedback 
effects.82 Yet, rather than stability, we observe profound change in the transnational design of 
IOs, suggesting that IOs are more amenable to reform than existing research assumes. 
 Our results also underline the necessity of comparative analyses. To date, most research 
on the design of international organizations focuses on one or a limited number of IOs. As 
Koremenos notes: “[W]e have lots of information about how certain variables operate in 
specific cases but little information about how those variables operate over the range of cases 
that international cooperation presents.”83 As illustrated by our findings, this approach carries 
a high likelihood of biased generalizations. Students of international institutional design are 
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 Scharpf 1988. 
80
 Hawkins et al. 2006. 
81
 Barnett and Finnemore 2004. 
82
 Pierson 2004. 
83
 Koremenos 2012, 6. 
50 
 
therefore well-advised to explore designs that allow us to better capture general dynamics in 
global governance. 
 A second area of research for which this article carries implications is the literature on 
TNA influence in global governance.84 Institutional access is frequently identified as a central 
determinant of TNA influence.85 Truman, in his seminal work on interest groups, even 
regards it as a precondition, arguing that “power of any kind cannot be reached by a political 
interest group, or its leaders, without access to one or more key points of decision in the 
government.”86 Rather than having to rely primarily on public-opinion mobilization and 
informal lobbying, TNAs with access to policy-making can employ a broader, and potentially 
more effective, portfolio of resources and strategies. With access, TNAs get more 
opportunities to provide information, argue for their positions, shape implementation, and 
hold states to their commitments. 
 Our findings suggest that the institutional preconditions for TNAs influence have 
improved dramatically over time, and are particularly favorable in policy fields such as 
human rights, development, and environment, and at the stages of policy formulation, 
implementation, and monitoring and enforcement. These findings can help to explain why 
existing research often identifies TNA influence in the formulation of environmental policy 
and the monitoring of human rights.87 Nevertheless, we should not assume that access and 
influence have a linear relationship. Access may not be sufficient by itself or reflect a genuine 
IO interest in TNA input. Teasing out the conditionality of institutional access as an 
explanation of TNA influence is an important task for future research. 
 A third area of research for which this article has important consequences is the 
normative debate on democracy in global governance. The democratic legitimacy of global 
                                                 
84
 For overviews, see Florini 2006; Risse 2012. 
85
 E.g., Bouwen 2002; Betsill and Corell 2008. 
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 Truman 1951, 264. 
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 E.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Betsill and Corell 2008; Murdie and Davis 2012. 
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governance has occupied many researchers over the past two decades.88 One influential line 
of theorizing highlights the potential for a democratization of global governance through more 
involvement of civil society. According to this notion, varyingly referred to as global 
stakeholder democracy, transnational democracy, and democratic polycentrism, TNAs can 
function as a “transmission belt” between the global citizenry and IOs, whose organized 
inclusion furthers democratic values such as participation, accountability, and transparency.89  
 Our results on TNA access speak to the empirical viability of this normative vision and 
yield a mixed verdict. The opening up of IOs to TNAs is likely to be good news for advocates 
of global stakeholder democracy, because access may provide channels of citizen 
participation, introduce mechanisms of external accountability, and improve transparency. At 
the same time, a set of enduring limitations in TNA involvement may be cause for pessimism. 
When IOs open up, they are typically selective in terms of which TNAs they invite. Some 
policy areas still remain nearly closed, and the opportunities for TNA involvement are least 
extensive at the democratically most central stage of international cooperation – decision-
making. These patterns suggest that challenges remain, even if the institutional preconditions 
for a civil society-based democratization of global governance have improved in recent 
decades. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
88
 E.g., Zürn 2000; Keohane and Nye 2003; Moravcsik 2005; Archibugi et al. 2011. 
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Annex 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of TNA Access, (ln)Index 
 
  
53 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2. Lag Effects on TNA Access (Index) 
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Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Observations Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
TNA Access, Index 9007 0.4739 0.6966 0.0000 6.1000
        Within IOs  0.4712  
        Across IOs  0.4352  
TNA Access, Index (ln) 9007 0.3046 0.3833 0.0000 1.9601
TNA Access, depth (ln) 9007 0.2282 0.2833 0.0000 1.2238
TNA Access, range (ln) 9007 0.2599 0.2926 0.0000 1.4816
TNA Access, Index (ln), >0 9007 0.3046 0.3833 0.0000 1.9601
Participatory discourse  8411 1173.3010 1521.8070 0.0000 5010.0000
UN conferences 8989 4.4610 4.5209 0.0000 15.3173
Protests against IO (ln) 9007 0.7349 1.6180 0.0000 7.2731
Protests against similar IOs 
(ln) 9007 3.8176 2.3060 0.0000 8.0240
Media coverage (ln) 7871 2.9657 4.3863 0.0000 16.7362
Technical complexity 9007 0.6726 0.8855 0.0000 2.0000
Local activity 9007 0.2211 0.4964 0.0000 2.0000
Non-compliance incentives 9007 0.1531 0.4782 0.0000 2.0000
Level of democracy 8752 4.0994 4.8532 -8.7500 10.0000
Decision-making  9007 0.3658 0.4817 0.0000 1.0000
Security 9007 0.0916 0.2885 0.0000 1.0000
IO budget 8791 3.6263 2.5943 -1.6094 8.8537
Affinity of member states 8336 -0.7439 0.1585 -0.9887 0.0996
Democratic major power  9007 0.3438 0.4750 0.0000 1.0000
TNA supply (ln) 8894 6.2647 1.2964 2.1972 8.7587
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